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Quality in European Trade Mark Law 
By Andrew Griffiths∗ 
This article addresses the capacity of trade marks to provide assurance concerning 
product quality and the importance of this capacity in promoting competition and various 
forms of innovation.  It considers the meaning of “quality” in this context and shows how 
this can include the aesthetic and intangible characteristics of products as well as their 
functional and material characteristics.  And it is suggested that quality assurance should 
cover the whole range of variable product characteristics to which at least some 
consumers attach value.  This is because the key economic problem that underlies the 
need for this assurance is the difficulty that consumers may face in ascertaining or 
verifying the presence or absence of certain product characteristics.  This article 
explains this problem of information asymmetry and shows how trade marks enable firms 
to mitigate it by providing quality assurance. 
 
As a matter of law, a trade mark merely guarantees that there is unitary control over the 
quality of marked products.  The force behind a trade mark’s quality assurance is 
economic in nature and depends on its owner’s interest in maximizing the trade mark’s 
value as a marketing resource.  There are various ways in which the owner can build up 
this value. These include investing in advertising and other promotional activity and in 
developing the trade mark’s capacity to confer intangible quality on marked products by 
establishing an image or particular set of associations for it.  This explains the dynamic 
nature of a trade mark’s capacity to provide quality assurance.  The article notes how 
European trade mark law provides additional protection for some trade marks that focus 
directly on their value and vulnerability as marketing resources and does not simply rely 
on protecting the integrity of the underlying legal guarantee. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 622 
II. PRODUCT QUALITY ....................................................................................... 624 
III. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE NEED FOR 
QUALITY ASSURANCE .................................................................................. 628 
IV. A TRADE MARK’S LEGAL GUARANTEE OF 
QUALITY CONTROL ....................................................................................... 630 
V. A TRADE MARK’S ECONOMIC “GUARANTEE” OF 
PRODUCT QUALITY ....................................................................................... 635 
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 640 
 
* Reader in Law, School of Law, University of Manchester, UK. 




¶1  Trade marks provide the legal basis of a marketing resource that firms can use to 
stimulate or strengthen demand for their products and gain a competitive advantage.1  In 
particular, firms can use trade marks to provide quality assurance for their products and 
may have to do this to compete effectively on the basis of product quality.  Trade marks 
enable firms to gain a competitive advantage based on both product quality and 
quality assurance. 
¶2  By registering a sign as a trade mark, a firm acquires the exclusive right to use it to 
confer a distinctive identity on its products.2  This trade mark then provides a reference 
point for consumers’ enquiries and decision-making, and the firm can use it to promote 
its products through advertising and other marketing activity.3  In the European Union, 
the Court of Justice (or “CJEU”)4 has stated that trade marks should help a system of 
“undistorted competition” to emerge by enabling firms to attract and retain customers by 
the quality of their products and, in effect, to provide them with quality assurance.5  This 
view of the economic role of trade marks raises a number of issues which this article will 
explore.  These include the significance of product quality as a basis of competition, the 
importance of quality assurance as a means of achieving undistorted competition, and the 
way in which trade marks enable firms to provide quality assurance.  However, it is first 
necessary to look more closely at the nature of competition because this provides the 
context of these issues. 
¶3  There are differing conceptions of competition in economics.6  In classical 
economic theory, for example, a perfectly competitive market is one in which a large 
 
1 This article will focus on the system of registered trade marks in the European Union.  However, 
unregistered signs used as trade marks may also enjoy some legal protection under the national laws of 
Member States.  In the United Kingdom, for example, protection is available under the common law tort of 
passing off.  A registered trade mark must be registered for a designated kind (or kinds) of products on the 
basis that the applicant is already using the relevant sign as a trade mark for products of this kind or has a 
bona fide intention of doing so. 
2 “In relation to trade marks . . . [the proprietor] has the exclusive right to use that trade mark for the 
purpose of putting a product into circulation for the first time . . .”: Case 102/77, Hoffmann-la-Roche v. 
Centrafarm 3 E.C.R. 1149, 7 C.M.L.R. 217 (1978). 
3 As an activity, marketing covers the various ways in which a firm can shape and influence consumers’ 
preferences and decision-making and respond to these preferences and decisions, with an emphasis on 
communication and the building of relationships through advertising and other techniques.  See Gregory T. 
Gundlach & William L. Wilkie, The American Marketing Association’s New Definition of Marketing: 
Perspective and Commentary on the 2007 Revision, 28 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 259 (2009); see also 
Peter F. Drucker, Marketing and Economic Development, 22 J. MARKETING 252, 253 (1958); Jenny 
Darroch, Drucker on Marketing: An Interview with Peter Drucker, 37 J. ACAD. MARKETING 8, 10 (2009). 
4 The Court of Justice is the senior court in the institution which has been officially titled “The Court of 
Justice of the European Union” since the Treaty of Lisbon took effect on December 1, 2009, and was 
previously known as “The European Court of Justice”.  Trade mark law in the European Union has been 
substantially harmonized and is subject to Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2008, which codified First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 (as 
amended) [hereinafter the Directive].  The CJEU has the power to give authoritative rulings on the meaning 
and application of the Directive’s provisions and courts and other tribunals in the Member States must 
interpret and apply domestic legislation to give effect to the Directive and the rulings of the CJEU on its 
meaning and application.  See Case 106/89, Marleasing v. La Commercial Internacional, 1 E.C.R. I-04135 
(1992); Case 391/01, 403/01, Pfeiffer v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 1 E.C.R. I-08835, 1 C.M.L.R. 
1123 (2005). 
5 See, e.g., Case C-349/95, Loendersloot (Frits) v. Ballantine 1998 E.C.R. I-6244 ¶ 22. 
6 For a detailed survey identifying eleven economic approaches to competition, see ROGER J VAN DEN 




number of firms offer homogeneous products to consumers who have a fixed set of 
preferences and complete information about all matters relevant to their decision-
making.7  The forces of supply and demand determine the market price, and firms are 
forced to compete through minimizing their costs.  Competition is, in effect, an external 
disciplinary force that should lead to an equilibrium in which overall wealth is 
maximized.  There would not be any useful role for trade marks in such a market because 
competing products would not differ and consumers would choose on the basis of price.  
In reality, however, competing products do differ from each other in various ways of 
significance to consumers and in particular in terms of quality.  This leaves room for 
firms to compete on the basis of quality and other forms of difference.8  Moreover, 
consumers do not necessarily have complete information about these differences, which 
means that firms may have to provide quality assurance and compete on this basis as 
well.9  Trade marks, therefore, do have a useful role since they enable firms to inform 
consumers about product differences and to provide quality assurance and enable 
consumers to take account of these matters in their decision-making. 
¶4  There is another conception of competition that provides guidance on the value of 
trade marks as a marketing resource.  This is the dynamic conception that treats 
competition as an ongoing process in which firms seek to survive, grow and prosper over 
time.10  Here, the focus is on increasing overall wealth in terms of size, quality and 
diversity.11  Firms can compete to gain an advantage in various ways including product 
improvement, product development, and engaging in other forms of innovation.12  The 
dynamic conception of competition highlights the fact that products and product quality 
can change in various ways and for various reasons, adding to the potential complexity of 
consumers’ decision-making.  Moreover, innovation increases the need for quality 
assurance as a substitute for information about product quality.  Trade marks provide 
useful reference points for consumers’ decision-making and for providing the information 
and quality assurance that this decision-making may require.  It is the need for quality 
assurance that explains the full economic importance of trade marks in promoting forms 
of competition based on product quality.  Trade marks can be said to “guarantee” product 
quality by providing credible assurance about the likely quality of the products sold under 
 
BERGH & PETER D. CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 54–104 (2006). 
7 On the characteristics of this ideal and the assumptions on which it rests, see VAN DEN BERGH & 
CAMESASCA, supra note 6, at 19–23. 
8 LAWRENCE ABBOTT, QUALITY AND COMPETITION: AN ESSAY IN ECONOMIC THEORY (1955). 
9 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. 
J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
10 See VAN DEN BERGH & CAMESASCA, supra note 6, at 86–90.  See also MICHAEL H. BEST, THE NEW 
COMPETITION: INSTITUTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING (1990); James A. Clifton, Competition and 
the Evolution of the Capitalist Mode of Production, CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 137–51 (1977); Paul Gorecki, 
The Process of Competition, J. ROYAL ECON. SOC. (2000). 
11 This is an improvement in terms of “dynamic efficiency”, which has been depicted as an increase in 
the “ecological diversity and complexity of the economy.”  Richard N. Langlois, The New Institutional 
Economics: An Introductory Essay, in ECONOMICS AS A PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS 15 (Richard N. Langois ed., 1986). 
12 On the various forms of innovation, see, for example, European Commission Paper, Innovation 
Policy: Updating the Union’s Approach in the Context of the Lisbon Strategy, COM (2003) 112 final (Nov. 
3, 2003). 
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them.13  They are an “essential element” of a system of undistorted competition because 
firms have to use them to gain an advantage in the various ways that depend on having 
this capacity.14 
¶5  This article will proceed as follows.  Section II will consider the meaning of 
“quality” in relation to products.  Section III will examine the problem of information 
asymmetry and the need for quality assurance.  Section IV will show how a trade mark’s 
legal guarantee of trade origin underpins a trade mark’s capacity to provide quality 
assurance.  Section V will examine the nature of the quality assurance which a trade mark 
can provide and the various ways in which the owner of a trade mark can generate and 
boost this capacity.  This section will also note how the law protecting trade marks has 
come to focus directly on protecting this capacity as well as on protecting it indirectly 
through protecting the underlying legal guarantee of trade origin.  Section VI will draw 
some conclusions. 
¶6  For ease of exposition, the following terms will have the following meanings in this 
article unless the context requires otherwise: “consumers” will refer to all potential 
purchasers of a firm’s products, including parties further down the stream or streams of 
production and distribution in which the firm operates; the “Directive” will mean the 
directive which has substantially harmonized trade mark law in the European Union;15 
the “owner” of a trade mark will mean its registered proprietor and, although it may be a 
person or a group of persons, the owner will be treated as singular and neuter since it is 
often a company; “products” will refer to goods and services; and, as in the Directive, the 
term “undertaking” will be used to refer to a firm or other business enterprise, including a 
group or network of firms that can function as a cohesive unit.16  Also, it will be assumed 
that the owner of a trade mark is the controller of any greater undertaking of which it 
forms part, though in practice it may be a subordinate member of such an undertaking 
and have a superior controller.  
II. PRODUCT QUALITY 
¶7  Quality is a notoriously elusive concept,17 but there are two broad conceptions that 
are relevant to analyzing the quality of products on the market.  One is an absolute 
standard of excellence, which holds that products should be as good as it is possible for 
 
13 The CJEU has referred to the functions of a trade mark as including that of “guaranteeing the quality 
of the goods or services in question.”  See, e.g., L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, (Case C-487/07) [2009] ETMR 
at 987, ¶ 58.  On the economic nature of this guarantee, see Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Hag II: 
“although trade marks do not provide any form of legal guarantee of quality—the absence of which may 
have led some to underestimate their significance—they do in economic terms provide such a guarantee, 
which is acted upon daily by consumers.”  Case 10/89, SA Cnl-Sucal v. Hag, 3 E.C.R. I-03711,  3 
C.M.L.R. 571 (1990). 
14 Case C-349/95, Loendersloot (Frits) v. Ballantine 1998 E.C.R. I-6244 ¶ 22.  On how competition 
through quality and competition through innovation may conflict with each other, see Robert E. Cole & 
Tsuyoshi Matsumiya, Too Much of a Good Thing? Quality as an Impediment to Innovation, 50 CAL. 
MGMT. REV. 77 (2007). 
15 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
16 Case 9/93, IHT v. Ideal-Standard, 3 E.C.R. I-02789,  3 C.M.L.R. at 857, ¶¶ 38–39 (1994). 
17 Carol A. Reeves & David A. Rednar, Defining Quality: Alternatives and Implications, 19 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 419 (1994).  See generally ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE 
MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY INTO VALUES (1974). 




them to be.18  This ideal is hard to define except in vague and abstract terms and, whilst 
achieving this standard is a worthy objective, it has become less relevant in the age of the 
mass production and mass marketing of standardized products compared to ensuring that 
they are consistent, reliable and free from defects.19  For many products, achieving 
excellence is likely to be costly and something that many consumers are willing to forego 
in exchange for a lower price. 
¶8  The other broad conception of quality is a relative and variable standard covering a 
range of characteristics which consumers look for in a product, but which they are willing 
to trade off against price in search of an optimal balance or overall “value.”20  This 
balance may vary with the kind of products at issue, with the preferences of particular 
consumers, and also across time.21  Consumers will attach importance not only to the 
level of the quality of a particular product, but also to whether they can be confident that 
it does have the level that it purports to have.22  From this perspective, product quality has 
positive and negative aspects: products should match the specifications they are presented 
as having and meet the requirements of consumers and they should be free from defects 
and any other potential causes of consumer dissatisfaction.23  Confidence about both of 
these aspects of quality is necessary for consumers to be able to choose among competing 
products by looking for the best overall value.  Trade marks are a means of providing the 
kind of information and assurance on which this confidence can be based. 
¶9  In the economic analysis of trade mark law, products of the same kind have been 
presented as liable to vary on the basis of “quality” and “variety” characteristics.24  In this 
categorization, quality characteristics are defined as ones which all consumers are likely 
to regard as improving and adding value to a particular product, such as its functional 
performance, reliability, and durability.  Variety characteristics are defined as ones that 
only some consumers are likely to value according to their subjective preferences and 
tastes.25  However, it is arguable that the capacity to provide quality assurance can be 
important in relation to both kinds of characteristic and that quality should therefore be 
treated as covering all variable characteristics to which consumers may attach value.  
Moreover, consumers may differ significantly in their valuation of so-called “quality” 
characteristics, and differentiation has become an increasing source of value for many 
kinds of products.  The latter trend reflects changes in the second half of the twentieth 
century on both the supply side, with smaller scale and more flexible systems of 
production becoming as efficient as mass production,26 and the demand side, with 
consumers attaching greater weight to product differences in their decision-making.27 
 
18 B.W. Tuchman, The Decline of Quality, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 2, 1980, at 38–41. 
19 David A. Garvin, What Does “Product Quality” Really Mean?, 26 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 25 (1984); 
Reeves & Rednar, supra note 17. 
20 See Reeves & Rednar, supra note 17, at 420–21. 
21 Art Kleiner, Beware Product Death Cycles, STRATEGY AND BUSINESS, http://www.strategy-
business.com/article/enews042805?gko=86f20 (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
22 See Garvin, supra note 19; David A. Garvin, Product Quality: An Important Strategic Weapon, BUS. 
HORIZONS, at 40–43 (1984). 
23 JURAN’S QUALITY CONTROL HANDBOOK § 2.3 (J.M. Juran & Frank M. Gryna eds., 1988); see also 
Reeves & Rednar, supra note 17, at 424–25.   
24 Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525 (1988). 
25 Id. 
26 RICHARD N. LANGLOIS, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM: SCHUMPETER, CHANDLER, AND 
THE NEW ECONOMY (2007); MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: 
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¶10  In the literature on quality management,28 one analyst has identified eight 
“dimensions” of product quality in an attempt to provide more detailed guidance on the 
nature of quality and how an undertaking can produce and reproduce it.29  Six of these 
dimensions identify various functional and material characteristics to which consumers 
are likely to attach value when choosing among competing products and which provide 
some elaboration of the broad positive and negative aspects of quality that were noted 
above.  They are performance, features (or “bells and whistles”), reliability, conformance 
with specifications, durability and serviceability (the speed and ease with which a product 
can be repaired if necessary).30  However, the other two dimensions, namely aesthetics 
and perceived quality, go beyond the functional and material quality of products and are 
of particular relevance to analyzing the role of trade marks in relation to product quality.  
And the reference to “perceived quality” highlights the close connection that can exist in 
practice between product quality and quality assurance and the fact that consumers may 
come to base their decisions on quality assurance rather than on actual product quality. 
¶11  The aesthetic quality of a product covers the various ways in which it may appeal 
to the senses of consumers including its appearance, design, and presentation.  Marketing 
practitioners have emphasized the importance of aesthetics, recognizing that this can 
influence consumers’ decision-making in various ways, and in some cases, help to shape 
their initial impressions of functional and material quality.31  Moreover, while aesthetics 
are often a matter of personal judgment, for some products (such as designer clothing and 
fashion goods), consumers may seek guidance from others whom they regard as better 
qualified and, therefore, attach value to quality assurance.32  Aesthetic quality can also be 
linked to the increasing value that consumers attach to product differentiation, and to the 
fact that this differentiation can be designed to appeal to consumers at the emotional or 
psychological level.33  In effect, marketing can be used to give products an intangible 
layer of quality.  An undertaking may therefore use advertising and other marketing 
 
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984). 
27 This trend can be related to the idea that consumer demand tends to evolve up a scale of human needs 
from a preoccupation with satisfying lower-order “deficit” needs (such as physiological needs, safety and 
security) to much greater interest in fulfilling higher-order needs or wants (such as status and self-
fulfilment), which has been drawn from the humanistic psychology of Abraham Maslow.  DAVID A. AAKER 
& ERICH JOACHIMSTHALER, BRAND LEADERSHIP 48–49 (2000); J.B. Swann et al., Trademarks and 
Marketing, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 787 (2001).  The trend can also be related to Thorstein Veblen’s theory of 
conspicuous consumption and the idea of consumption as a means of signalling social status.  Barton 
Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004); R. Joseph Monsen & 
Anthony Downs, Public Goods and Private Status, 23 PUB. INTEREST 64, 64–77 (1971). 
28 See supra note 17. 
29 See GARVIN, supra note 19; GARVIN, supra note 22; David A. Garvin, Competing on the Eight 
Dimensions of Quality, 65 HARV. BUS. REV. 101, 101–09 (1987) (arguing that an undertaking should focus 
its efforts on certain of these dimensions in particular and look to find a suitable “niche” in order to achieve 
a competitive advantage). 
30 Id. 
31 See John J. Wheatley & John S. Y. Chiu, The Effects of Price, Store Image, and Product and 
Respondent Characteristics on Perceptions of Quality, 14 J. MARKETING RES. 181 (1977). The work of 
Louis Cheskin has been influential in this respect.  See, e.g., LOUIS CHESKIN, COLORS: WHAT THEY CAN 
DO FOR YOU (1947); see also LOUIS CHESKIN, HOW TO PREDICT WHAT PEOPLE WILL BUY (1957). 
32 Brian Hilton et al., The Ethics of Counterfeiting in the Fashion Industry: Quality, Credence and 
Profits Issues, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 345 (2004). 
33 See AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 27; see also NANCY F. KOEHN, BRAND NEW: HOW 
ENTREPRENEURS EARNED CONSUMERS’ TRUST FROM WEDGWOOD TO DELL 307–39 (2001). 




techniques to associate its products with an attractive image or a specific set of values to 
increase its appeal to consumers.34  Consumers may then attach greater value to these 
products because they offer a means of self-expression, a sense of belonging to a 
community, or a way of making a statement about social status.35  This at least partly 
explains the high prices that some consumers may be willing to pay for luxury goods and 
other “status” products. 
¶12  Trade marks can play a crucial role in creating and maintaining intangible quality 
because they provide the means whereby undertakings can cultivate an image and other 
associations for their products in advertising and other promotional activity.  This role 
goes beyond providing reassurance about the quality of the marked products, to a more 
active role of conferring intangible quality onto the products or even forming part of their 
overall quality.  The capacity of trade marks to confer intangible quality is a controversial 
aspect of trade mark law because it may require a wider zone of legal protection than is 
necessary to protect trade marks’ capacity to provide assurance about other forms of 
quality.36  This point will be considered in later sections of this article where it will be 
suggested that the two roles cannot be neatly separated because intangible quality can 
also be a source of assurance about “tangible” quality.  One reason why this aspect of 
trade mark law has been so controversial is that it is debatable whether intangible quality 
has enough social value to be worth protecting, and it is even arguable that enabling 
undertakings to engage in this form of marketing is a cause of social harm.37  In any 
event, it adds complexity to competition in the other dimensions of quality through 
creating additional emotional and psychological “switching costs” for consumers.38  
Nevertheless, in the case of European trademark law, the CJEU has ruled that the overall 
quality of luxury goods can include certain intangible or “mental” characteristics which 
result from their being associated with a prestigious image which bestows on them an 
aura of luxury, and that this particular quality-conferring role of a trademark can justify 
specific legal protection.39 
 
34 For a brief summary of how “Values, Attitudes and Lifestyles” or “VALs” marketing has been used to 
influence consumer decision-making in the United Kingdom since the 1950s, see ED HOWKER & SHIV 
MALIK, JILTED GENERATION: HOW BRITAIN HAS BANKRUPTED ITS YOUTH 164–72 (2010); see also 
Wolfgang Streeck, Citizens as Consumers: Considerations on the New Politics of Consumption, 76 NEW 
LEFT REV. 27, 28–36 (2012). 
35 GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 84–104 (2000); see also Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 809 (2010); Douglas B. Holt, What Becomes an Icon Most?, 81 HARV. BUS. REV. 43 
(2003). 
36 See, e.g., Dev Gangjee & Robert Burrell, Because You’re Worth It: L’Oréal and the Prohibition on 
Free Riding, 73 MODERN L. REV. 282 (2010); Martin Senftleben, Trade Mark Protection: A Black Hole in 
the Intellectual Property Galaxy, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 383–87 (2011). 
37 See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 
57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948); see also Avner Offer, The Mask of Intimacy: Advertising and the Quality 
of Life, in THE CHALLENGE OF AFFLUENCE: SELF-CONTROL AND WELL-BEING IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
BRITAIN SINCE 1950, at 103 (2006). 
38 On the impact of “switching costs” on competition, see Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer 
Switching Costs, 102 Q. J. ECON. 375 (1987); Paul Klemperer, Competition when Consumers Have 
Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and 
International Trade, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 515 (1995). 
39 Copad v. Christian Dior Couture (Case C-59/08) [2009] ETMR 683 ¶¶ 24–26; Parfums Christian Dior 
v. Evora (Case C-337/95) [1997] ETMR 26, at 45. 
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¶13  As indicated above, it is arguable that the eighth dimension of “perceived quality” 
is better viewed as an aspect of quality assurance, and therefore as an additional basis on 
which undertakings may have to compete with each other.  The problem of information 
asymmetry, which will be examined in section III, is that consumers may have to base 
their choices and decision-making on the perceived quality of a product rather than its 
actual quality. Consumers may look to the appearance of a product and even to its price 
to help form an initial perception of its likely quality,40 but need more credible forms of 
quality assurance for reliable guidance.41  Perceived quality can be based on the fact that 
marked products or a particular trade mark enjoys a reputation in the minds of consumers 
concerning product quality.  It can also reflect certain other signals that give them 
reassurance that the actual quality of marked products will meet their expectations.  
Consumers may therefore focus on perceived quality in their decision-making.  The 
economic problems that explain the need for quality assurance and the importance of 
perceived quality will be examined in more detail. 
III. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE NEED FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE 
¶14  For undertakings to be able to compete with each other in terms of the quality of 
their products, consumers should be able to recognize differences in quality and to 
specify fully and precisely their requirements (both positive and negative) in this respect.  
In practice, this may be especially difficult in relation to the negative aspect of quality, 
since consumers would have to anticipate all potential causes of dissatisfaction at the 
time of purchase.  This problem increases the costs of communication, which include the 
risks of disappointment due to errors and other forms of miscommunication.  One 
advantage that trade marks have as a means of combating this problem is that they 
identify and refer to products that are likely to be consistent with each other.  This can be 
a much less costly basis for communication and decision-making, especially in the case 
of recurring purchases. 
¶15  A related problem is that the quality of a particular undertaking’s products may 
depend on its attributes as an organization, these covering such matters as effective 
teamwork and the kind of idiosyncratic practices, skills and knowledge that have been 
termed organizational “capabilities.”42   It may be impossible to specify the resulting quality 
objectively as a particular combination of positive and negative characteristics, or even as 
the outcome of a specific set of procedures, especially since it may not be possible to 
replicate the necessary capabilities.43  Again, a trade mark has value as a basis for 
 
40 See Wheatley & Chiu, supra note 31.   
41 See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby et al., Price, Brand Name and Product Composition Characteristics as 
Determinants of Perceived Quality, 55 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 570, 570 (1971) (“[N]either price nor brand 
name had significant effects on perceived quality except when product composition characteristics were 
allowed to vary between product samples.”). 
42 See, e.g., Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 19 (2002); Richard N. Langlois & Nicholas J. Foss, Capabilities and Governance: The Rebirth of 
Production in the Theory of Economic Organization, 52 KYKLOS 201 (1999).  See generally EDITH 
PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (4th ed. 2009); G.B. Richardson, The Organisation 
of Industry, 82 ECON. J. 883 (1972), reprinted in G.B. RICHARDSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT 
KNOWLEDGE: COLLECTED PAPERS OF G.B. RICHARDSON 143 (1998). 
43 For a discussion on the unique character of the products of tacit knowledge and skills acquired 
through experience see MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL 




communication because it identifies products that are likely to be consistent with each other 
at the deep level that can be achieved through their being the products of the same 
undertaking.  This is an important factor as to why an undertaking can gain a competitive 
advantage on the basis of product quality, and why the trade mark system is necessary to 
secure this advantage. 
¶16  However, the main explanation for the importance of trademarks in competition based 
on product quality lies beyond these problems of communication in the economic problem 
known as “information asymmetry.”44  This means that consumers may not be able to 
discern and verify the quality of a particular product and therefore may not distinguish 
high quality products from lower quality competitors, or at least may face substantial 
costs in order to do so.  It is attributable both to a lack of expertise on the part of 
consumers and to the fact that it may simply not be possible to discern all the positive and 
negative characteristics of a product that contribute to its overall quality at the time of 
purchase.  The nature and extent of the problem varies according to the kind of product 
and the kind of expertise that may be necessary to determine a particular consumer’s 
requirements and to detect or verify the presence or absence of particular 
characteristics.45  The problem increases as products become more complex and where 
systems of packaging and distribution make it harder to inspect products prior to 
purchase.  For all these reasons, competition based on product quality has come to 
depend on the ability of undertakings to provide credible quality assurance to consumers. 
¶17  In terms of its impact on the overall wealth of society, information asymmetry, if 
not mitigated, would give rise to significant static and dynamic costs.46  The static costs 
include the additional “search costs” which consumers would have to incur in order to 
verify the quality of a product, including any remaining risk of purchasing an inferior 
product.  Search costs increase the total price that consumers, in effect, have to pay for a 
product and therefore distort competition.  If not mitigated, they represent a significant 
barrier for consumers wishing to purchase a product on the basis of quality.  The dynamic 
costs reflect the fact that, if not combated, information asymmetry would reduce or 
undermine the incentives that firms have to produce and supply good quality products 
which are free from deficiencies.  It would also give rise to harmful incentives by 
favoring unscrupulous firms selling inferior products.  Moreover, it would discourage 
various forms of innovation that could improve product quality or reduce production 
costs, and especially innovations that would make product quality harder to verify. 
¶18  In the economic analysis of information, the characteristics of products that 
contribute to their overall quality (including freedom from deficiencies) have been 
categorized as “search” or “experience” according to whether or not their presence or 
absence can (in theory at least) be discerned or verified at the point of purchase, or at 
 
PHILOSOPHY 49–65 (corrected ed. 1962). 
44 Akerlof, supra note 9; A. Postlethwaite, Asymmetric Information, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: 
ALLOCATION, INFORMATION AND MARKETS 35 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989); C. Wilson, Adverse 
Selection, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: ALLOCATION, INFORMATION AND MARKETS (John Eatwell et al. eds., 
1989). 
45 Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 
67 (1973). 
46 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1987). 
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least prior to use or consumption.47  In this scheme, services are by their nature 
“experience” products, which is why purchasing services can be particularly problematic.48  
Moreover, some product characteristics may not be verifiable or become apparent until long 
after purchase and the consumers of some products may have to rely on the expertise of the 
service provider for guidance on the level of quality that is appropriate for their particular 
requirements.49  For this reason, a further category of “credence characteristics” is used to 
refer to characteristics that consumers have to take on trust from producers or suppliers.50  
Products can be categorized as “search,” “experience” and “credence” according to the type 
of characteristic likely to dominate consumers’ decision-making.51 
¶19  Undertakings wishing to compete on the basis of the quality of their products, 
therefore, have to find some way of combating the problem of information asymmetry and 
reducing consumers’ search costs.  Otherwise, they would face difficulty in selling their 
products at a sufficiently high price to secure an adequate return for the additional costs that 
producing or supplying quality products is likely to involve.52  In effect, an undertaking has 
to find a way of enabling consumers to acquire the necessary information at a relatively low 
cost or provide a satisfactory substitute for this information.  The law can help to mitigate 
the problem of information asymmetry at a general level, in particular by setting and 
enforcing minimum standards of quality and requiring the disclosure of information about 
quality.  Beyond this, undertakings have to provide credible assurance about the quality of 
their products and they can use trade marks to do this. 
¶20  The above categorization of products and product characteristics according to the 
nature and extent of the difficulty that consumers may face in order to verify their presence 
(or absence) is also relevant to the nature of the quality assurance that an undertaking may 
have to provide in this respect and to the extent of the investment that this may require.  The 
difficulty of providing satisfactory assurance about experience and credence characteristics 
helps to explain the extent of the competitive advantage that an undertaking may achieve if 
it can do so and the premium prices that it may be able to charge as a result.  Section IV will 
therefore examine the legal basis of a trade mark’s capacity to provide quality assurance that 
may cover all forms of product characteristics. 
IV. A TRADE MARK’S LEGAL GUARANTEE OF QUALITY CONTROL 
¶21  The portrayal of a trade mark as “guaranteeing” product quality is potentially 
misleading because the trade mark does not of itself give consumers any directly 
enforceable legal rights concerning the actual quality of marked products, and its owner’s 
incentive to meet consumers’ expectations in terms of quality does not result from any 
corresponding threat of legal sanction.53  Instead, the incentive results from the owner’s 
 
47 Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970). 
48 See Reeves & Rednar, supra note 17, at 426–27. 
49 Darby & Karni, supra note 45. 
50 Id. 
51 Economides, supra note 24. 
52 See Akerlof, supra note 9. 
53 F.K. Beier, Territoriality of Trade Mark Law and International Trade, 1 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & 
COPYRIGHT L. 48, 64 (1970); see also Hag II, 3 C.M.L.R. 571, at 583 (1990) (opinion of AG Jacobs).  The 
owner of a trademark is obliged to comply with any independent legal obligation to which it is subject 
concerning the quality of a marked product, the provision of information relating to quality and the risk of 




interest in building and maintaining a good reputation for its trade mark and in not risking 
damage to or the loss of such a reputation.  This incentive does rest on a legal guarantee, 
but it is a guarantee that one particular undertaking has authorized the marketing of the 
marked products under the trade mark and that this undertaking is in a position to control 
their quality.54  In trade mark law, a trade mark’s signification of this exclusive right is 
also presented as a legal guarantee about the “origin” (or “trade origin”) of the 
marked products.55 
¶22  A trade mark owner’s exclusive right to authorize the use of the trade mark to 
market products and therefore to authorize products of the relevant kind as legitimate 
marked products is the legal basis of the trade mark’s so-called “guarantee” of quality.56  
This exclusivity means that the owner is entitled to prohibit third parties from using its 
trademark to identify or refer to any products of the relevant kind which it has not 
authorized as marked products even if it is arguable that the unauthorized products are of 
the same quality as legitimate marked products and even if they have been produced or 
supplied by the same firm and according to the same specifications.57  In other words, the 
trade mark signifies unitary control over quality rather than a particular standard of 
quality.58  The owner has exclusive control over the track record of the marked products, 
along with the exclusive right to benefit from any power to attract consumers, which the 
trade mark may acquire on the basis of this track record.  The owner therefore has a good 
reason not to authorize products as marked products unless it has a reliable basis on 
which it can verify and vouch for their quality. 
¶23  The CJEU has gone further and established that the ability of a trade mark owner 
(or the superior controller of a greater undertaking) to exercise continuing control over 
 
misleading consumers on matters of quality.  In particular, a trade mark should not deceive consumers 
about the quality of marked products, and the Directive provides that a trade mark should be refused 
registration or, as appropriate, be liable to revocation if it is or becomes “of such a nature as to deceive the 
public, for instance as to the nature, quality or geographical origin of the goods or service.”  The Directive, 
supra note 4, arts. 3.1(g), 12.2(b); see also Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of 
Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363 (1974). 
54 Case 9/93, IHT Internazionale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal Standard GmbH, 3 C.M.L.R. 857, ¶¶ 38–
39 (1994). 
55 Recital (11) of the preamble to the Directive states that the function of the protection of a trade mark 
is “in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin . . . .”  The Directive, supra note 4, 
preamb. recital 11.  The CJEU has described the “essential” function of a trademark as being “to guarantee 
the identity of the origin of the trade-marked product to the consumer or ultimate user.”  Case 102/77, 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH,  3 
C.M.L.R. 217, ¶ 7 (1978); Hag II, 3 C.M.L.R. 571, ¶ 14.  The use of the term “origin” in this context has 
been criticized because of its potential ambiguity.  See, e.g., WILLIAM CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  
OMNIPRESENT, DISTRACTING, IRRELEVANT? 89–90 (2004); FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 147–49 (Faculty of Law of Columbia Univ. et al. 
eds., Columbia University Press 1999) (1925).  Nevertheless, the use of this term has continued.  This 
article will use the variant “trade origin” to emphasize the special meaning of the term in trade mark law 
unless the context requires otherwise. 
56 See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
57 Major Bros. v. Franklin & Son, [1908] 1 K.B.KB 712 (H.C.); Primark v. Lollypop Clothing, [2001] 
ETMR 334 (H.C.). 
58 See, e.g., Lord Wright’s explanation of a trademark’s guarantee of trade origin in Aristoc v. Rysta: 
“The word ‘origin’ is no doubt used in a special and almost technical sense in this connection, but it 
denotes at least that the goods are issued as vendible goods under the aegis of the proprietor of the trade 
mark, who thus assumes responsibility for them . . . .” [1945] A.C. 68 at 101–02. 
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product quality is a distinct element of a trade mark’s legal guarantee to consumers.59  It 
was necessary to isolate this element in order to determine whether the respective 
products of two firms that are marketed under the same trade mark in different territories 
of the European Union should be treated as having the same trade origin.60  The CJEU 
has ruled that there must be a tie of legal or economic dependence between the two firms.  
In other words, the owner of a trade mark and any other firm purporting to authorize 
products as marked products should be linked in a way that establishes or reflects a single 
point of continuing control over the quality of the products in question for them to have 
the trade origin that the trade mark signifies.61 
¶24  Moreover, trade mark law does not limit the mechanisms through which the 
necessary unitary control over quality can be exercised.62  In the case of marked goods, 
for example, the owner is free to select or commission the goods from other firms 
because it can control their quality through inspection or by seeking reassurance before 
endorsing them as marked goods.63  In the case of goods or services, the owner is free to 
delegate the right to authorize products as marked products to another firm under a 
licence because it can control their quality by enforcement of the terms of the licence.64  
Article 8 of the Directive reinforces a trade mark owner’s ability to control quality 
through a licence by providing that a licensee’s power to authorize products as marked 
products is negated if there is a breach of any term relating to “the quality of the goods 
manufactured or of the services provided by the licensee.”65 
¶25  A trade mark’s signification of continuing control over product quality is reinforced 
by certain ancillary rights that its owner enjoys over its use as a product identifier and as 
a reference point in advertising and promotional material.  These include the owner’s 
 
59 “[A trade mark] must constitute a guarantee that all the products bearing it have been manufactured 
under the supervision of a single enterprise to which responsibility for their quality may be attributed.”  
Hag II, 3 C.M.L.R. 571, ¶ 13; see also IHT v. Ideal-Standard, 3 C.M.L.R. 857,  ¶¶ 38–39. 
60 See, e.g., the scenarios in Hag II, 3 C.M.L.R. 571 and IHT v. Ideal-Standard, 3 C.M.L.R. 857.  Under 
the principle of the free movement of goods, which is now set out in Article 34 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (or “TFEU”), the owner of a trade mark cannot prohibit its use for the 
further marketing of goods which another firm has already marketed under the same trade mark elsewhere 
in the European Union if the other firm’s goods have the same trade origin and in effect forms part of the 
same undertaking.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 34, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
61 Hag II, 3 C.M.L.R. 571, ¶ 15; IHT v. Ideal-Standard, 3 C.M.L.R. 857, ¶¶ 37–43.  It is not necessary 
that the unitary control over product quality be exercised vigilantly as long as there is a basis through which 
it can be exercised.   IHT v. Ideal-Standard, 3 C.M.L.R. 857, ¶¶ 38–39.  On de facto economic control, see 
Doncaster Pharm. Grp. v. Bolton Pharm.100, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 661. 
62 “The origin which the trade mark is intended to guarantee . . . is not defined by reference to the 
manufacturer but by reference to the point of control of manufacture.”  IHT v. Ideal-Standard, 3 C.M.L.R. 
857, ¶ 37. 
63 See, e.g., Primark v. Lollypop, [2001] ETMR 334 (H.C.). 
64 IHT v. Ideal-Standard, 3 C.M.L.R. 857, ¶ 37. 
65 Article 8.2 of the Directive provides: 
The proprietor of a trade mark may invoke the rights conferred by that trade mark against a 
licensee who contravenes any provision in his licensing contract with regard to: (a) its 
duration; (b) the form covered by the registration in which the trade mark may be used; (c) 
the scope of the goods or services for which the licence is granted; (d) the territory in which 
the trade mark may be affixed; or (e) the quality of the goods manufactured or of the services 
provided by the licensee. 
The Directive, supra note 4, art. 8.2.  See Copad v. Christian Dior (Case C-59/08) [2009] ETMR 683 
¶¶ 22–23. 




right to prohibit the use of its trade mark to identify a licensee’s products if there has 
been breach of a term relating to product quality.  In this context, the CJEU has ruled that 
the quality of a product can include intangible quality and has therefore been willing to 
protect the capacity of certain trade marks to confer this kind of quality on marked 
products.  This means that the owner may be entitled to prohibit use of its trade mark 
after breach of a term that contributes to the cultivation or protection of a particular 
image or set of associations for the trade mark.   Such a term could include a prohibition 
on distribution outside an authorized network or a restriction on certain forms of 
advertising.66  However, the CJEU has also ruled that the impact of infringing such a term 
on the trade mark’s capacity to confer intangible quality is different from the impact of 
infringing a term relating to tangible quality on the trade mark’s capacity to provide 
quality assurance and that assessing the legal consequences of a particular breach should 
take account of this difference.67 
¶26  In the case of marked goods, the owner is also entitled to prohibit the use of its 
trade mark as a product identifier for further marketing in circumstances in which the 
owner’s ability to vouch for their quality may be threatened.  This gives the owner the 
ability to exercise some continuing control over product quality as marked goods move 
downstream.  As a general rule, the owner of a trade mark cannot prohibit its use as a 
product identifier for further marketing within the European Economic Area (or 
“EEA”).68  This “exhaustion” of the owner’s rights ensures that the owner can profit from 
the marketing power of its trade mark for the first marketing of goods, but it cannot 
secure any additional profit on the further marketing of the goods within the EEA.69  This 
is designed to encourage downstream or “intra-brand” competition for marked goods and 
gives effect to the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods,70 which is 
designed to combat territorial partitioning and price discrimination within the EEA.  
However, the Directive provides that the owner’s rights should not be exhausted if it has 
“legitimate reasons” to oppose use of its trade mark, “especially where the condition of 
the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market.”71  The CJEU 
has ruled that the owner has a prima facie right to prohibit the use of its trade mark after 
any unauthorized interference with the marked goods in question that occurs after first 
marketing, including repackaging and even re-labelling.72 
 
66 Copad v. Christian Dior Couture (Case C-59/08) [2009] ETMR 683 ¶¶ 22–24, 27–37. 
67 Id. ¶¶ 30–32.  See Advocate General Kokott’s discussion of this point in her Opinion to the CJEU, id. 
¶¶ AG30–AG37. 
68 The Directive, supra note 4, art. 7.  This provision applies if either the owner or an economically-
linked undertaking has marketed the goods in question under the trade mark anywhere in the EEA or has 
consented to their being marketed under the trade mark in the EEA.  The EEA includes the member states 
of the European Union and certain member states of the European Free Trade Association. 
69 See Viking Gas v. Kosan Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 58 ¶¶ 31–32. 
70 Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (or “TFEU”) prohibits any legal 
restrictions on the movement of goods between member states for further marketing unless the restrictions 
can be justified on grounds of the protection of “industrial and commercial property.”  TFEU, supra note 
60, arts. 34, 36. 
71 The Directive, supra note 4, art. 7.  The CJEU has ruled that the circumstances in which this is the 
case are not limited to activity that may affect the functional or material quality of the marked products.  
Viking Gas v. Kosan Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 58 ¶ 36. 
72 Case C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer 
Erzeugnisse mbH,.3 C.M.L.R. 217 (1978); Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova (C-427/93) [1996] ETMR 1; 
Boehringer Ingelheim (No. 2) (C-348/04) [2007] ETMR 1164; Wellcome v. Paranova (C-276/05) [2009] 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 3  
 
634 
¶27  However, an unqualified right to prohibit the use of a trade mark after any 
unauthorized interference with the marked goods could undermine the principle of the 
free movement of goods, since many kinds of goods cannot easily be sold in exactly the 
same form in a different territory, at least not without losing much of the marketing 
advantage that the trade mark provided at first marketing.73  The same potential problem 
exists in relation to the trade mark owner’s exclusive right to authorize the use of its trade 
mark for the first marketing of goods if the owner (or a greater undertaking of which the 
owner forms a part) uses different trade marks to market what are essentially the same 
products in different member states of the EEA.74  Without qualification, the owner could 
prohibit the further marketing of rebranded goods that might be necessary to ensure 
effective downstream competition within the EEA. 
¶28  Therefore, to give full effect to the principle of the free movement of goods, the 
CJEU has established that a third party such as a parallel importer should be entitled to 
use a trade mark for the further marketing of goods in the EEA even after unauthorized 
interference with marked goods or, as the case may be, rebranding as long as the third 
party can satisfy five conditions.75  These conditions are equivalent to the broad terms 
that the owner would be likely to impose on a licensee in order to protect the trade mark’s 
value as a signifier of exclusive control over product quality and its reliability as a basis 
for providing quality assurance.76  In particular, a third party wishing to use the trade 
mark in such circumstances must give prior notice in writing to the owner along with a 
sample of the goods in its new packaging (or as otherwise adapted); it must prove that the 
unauthorized interference cannot have affected the original condition of the goods inside 
the packaging (whether directly or indirectly) and that the presentation of the adapted 
goods for further marketing (including the quality and appearance of their packaging) 
cannot damage the reputation of the trade mark and its owner.77  These conditions 
therefore help to protect the economic value of a trade mark as a signifier of exclusive 
control over product quality despite the threat to this exclusive control from the “free 
movement” rights that parallel importers and other third parties enjoy.78 
 
ETMR 363. 
73 Article 36 of the TFEU provides that the protection of property rights should not constitute a “means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction” on trade between member states and that any 
derogation from the principle of free movement must be limited accordingly.  TFEU, supra note 60, art. 36. 
74 Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Paranova (C-379/97) [1999] ETMR 937. 
75 Case C-102/77, Hoffmann-la Roche v. Centrafarm, 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (1978); Case C-427/93, Bristol-
Myers Squibb v. Paranova [1996] ETMR 1; Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Paranova (C-379/97) [1999] ETMR 
937; Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward (No. 1) (Case C-143/00) [2002] ETMR 898; Boehringer 
Ingelheim (No. 2) [2007] ETMR 1164; Wellcome v. Paranova (Case C-276/05) [2009] ETMR 363; Viking 
Gas v. Kosan Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 1117; Orifarm v. Merck (C-400/09 & C-207/10) [2011] ETMR 
1142. 
76 Hoffmann-la Roche, 3 CMLR 217 ¶ 11; Orifarm, [2011] ETMR 1142 ¶ 26. 
77 Bristol-Myers Squibb [1996] ETMR 1 ¶ 79.  An indirect effect on their condition includes, for 
example, the omission of important information or the insertion of extra articles that are not suitable. 
78 The CJEU has also ruled that a third party which is entitled to use a trade mark for the further 
marketing of marked goods has an ancillary right to use it in advertising or other promotional activity to 
publicize the further marketing, but that this ancillary right is subject to the owner’s interest in protecting 
the trade mark’s reputation including any image or aura it has acquired.  Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora 
(Case C-337/95) [1998] ETMR 26 ¶¶ 39–48.  The CJEU said that a balance had to be struck between the 
owner’s interest in protecting the image and “the reseller’s legitimate interest in being able to resell the 
goods in question by using advertising methods which are customary in his sector of trade.” See supra note 
39. 




¶29  A trade mark therefore guarantees that one undertaking (and, in effect, one 
organizational governance structure) has control over the quality of marked products and 
that this undertaking has consented to these particular products being marketed with this 
identity.  It signifies an assumption of commercial responsibility for product quality in 
the sense that the undertaking is willing for these products to contribute to the track 
record of the marked products and benefit from any attractive power that the trade mark 
confers.  However, this legal guarantee does not of itself provide any assurance about the 
quality of marked products.  Instead, the assurance depends on the degree to which the 
undertaking exercises its control over quality in practice. 
¶30  The CJEU has elaborated a trade mark’s legal guarantee of trade origin in a way 
that enables a trade mark to send an ancillary legal message about the organizational 
context of the product identity which it signifies.  A trade mark can be used to signify that 
there is an organizational or economic link between its product identity and another 
identity which is used to market products of the same, similar, or even dissimilar kind.  
The trade mark may do this through including a particular name or other sign in its 
component features that it shares in common with another trade mark or it may do so 
through some other kind of similarity to another trade mark.  Also, where an undertaking 
uses more than one trade mark to establish a particular marketing identity, it may use one 
(or more) of these trade marks to signify an organizational link or to signify a broader 
identity such as a corporate or umbrella brand. 
¶31  Using a trade mark to signify an organizational link does not send out the same 
clear message in terms of product quality consistency as the trade mark’s guarantee that 
marked products have a common trade origin, but the signal may still provide some 
guidance and assurance about likely product quality.  The ability to signify an 
organizational link in this way not only increases the potential value of the trade mark as 
a marketing resource, but also increases its vulnerability to damage from signs that 
consumers may perceive as signifying a link where none in fact exists. The CJEU has 
therefore ensured that the legal protection of trade marks under the Directive should take 
account of this particular vulnerability.79 This adaptation of the protection in effect 
secures the capacity of a trade mark to convey this ancillary message. 
V. A TRADE MARK’S ECONOMIC “GUARANTEE” OF PRODUCT QUALITY 
¶32  While a trade mark’s guarantee of trade origin is the legal basis of its capacity to 
provide quality assurance, it does not provide any such assurance of itself.80  The force 
behind any “guarantee” of quality that it does give is economic and not legal in nature.81  
 
79 On infringement under paragraph (a) of Article 5.1, see Google France v. Louis Vuitton (C-236/08) 
[2010] ETMR 503 ¶¶ 84–85, 89–90; Die BergSpechte v. Günter Guni (C-278/08) [2010] ETMR 592 
¶¶ 35–36; on infringement under paragraph (b), see Sabel v. Puma (C-251/95) [1998] ETMR 1 ¶¶ 16–18; 
Canon v. MGM (C-39/97) [1999] ETMR 1 ¶ 29; Lloyd Schuhfabrik v. Klijsen Handel (C-342/97) [1999] 
ETMR 690 ¶ 17; Medion v. Thomson Multimedia (C-120/04) [2006] ETMR 164 ¶ 26; O2 v. Hutchison 3G 
(C-533/06) [2008] ETMR 853 ¶ 32–36; on Article 5.2, see Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld (C-408/01) 
[2004] ETMR 129; on a third party’s ability to rely on the defences under Article 6, see BMW v. Deenik 
(C-63/9 7) [1999] ETMR 286 ¶ 51; Gillette v. LA-Laboratories (C-228/03) [2005] ETMR 825 ¶ 42. 
80 However, a trade mark should not mislead consumers about the quality of marked products.  See 
supra note 53. 
81 See supra note 13.  See also Scandecor Development v. Scandecor Marketing [2001] ETMR 800 ¶ 19 
(in which Lord Nicholls commented: “in relying on a trade mark consumers rely, not on any legal 
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It depends on the trade mark acquiring a reputation in the minds of consumers, on the 
value of a reputation of this kind as a marketing resource that can enable marked products 
to command premium prices and on the owner’s incentive to increase its value and to not 
let it decline.  Moreover, a trade mark’s capacity to provide quality assurance is likely to 
increase as it gains recognition and positive associations in the minds of consumers.82  
This progression requires investment and the owner’s incentive to secure a return on this 
investment adds to the force behind the quality assurance.  It is for this reason that a trade 
mark has been portrayed as a “self-enforcing” guarantee of quality.83  The progression of 
this quality assurance is therefore worth examining in detail. 
¶33  A trade mark’s legal guarantee of trade origin means that it is possible for marked 
products to be consistent with each other in terms of quality.  In practice, their 
consistency is likely to depend on the nature of the products in question, on the particular 
mechanism or mechanisms through which the owner has unitary control over product 
quality and on how rigorously the owner exercises this power.  Subject to these 
qualifications, a trade mark’s signification of likely consistency should give consumers a 
convenient reference point for communication, search and decision-making about product 
quality.  Such a reference point can be a much more useful and practical basis for these 
activities than attempting to define and express a desired level of quality in adequate 
detail (in the sense of specifying a desired combination of product characteristics 
including the absence of deficiencies).  Moreover, by enabling specific products on the 
market to be linked to a specific undertaking and to its behavior, a trade mark can 
increase the effectiveness of other mechanisms that are designed to combat information 
asymmetry through increasing the incentive to comply with these mechanisms.84 
¶34  However, even with the ease of communication and the ability to acquire 
information that it facilitates, a trade mark cannot of itself enable consumers to verify the 
experience and credence characteristics of products (or “unverifiable quality”) before 
purchase or (as the case may be) use or consumption.85  And even where the track record 
of marked products provides some guidance on unverifiable quality, this guidance is 
limited by the fact that the owner is under no obligation to maintain their consistency or 
to continue with a particular set of production arrangements that have achieved a 
particular depth of consistency.  Consumers therefore need quality assurance both to 
provide guidance about unverifiable quality and to counter the risk of a decline in quality.  
In the absence of quality assurance, consumers would face the risk of disappointment or 
 
guarantee of quality, but on the proprietor of a trade mark having an economic interest in maintaining the 
value of his mark”). 
82 The rise of the World Wide Web as an arena for the sale and marketing of products has altered the 
way in which many trade marks gain recognition and a reputation that may provide quality assurance, as 
well as the way in which consumers use trade marks to facilitate their searches and decision-making.  The 
CJEU has taken account of these developments in its rulings on the scope of the core right of a trade mark 
owner to prohibit third parties from using it in connection with the marketing of their own products. Google 
France v. Louis Vuitton (C-236/08) [2010] ETMR 503 ¶¶ 84–85, 89–90; Die BergSpechte v. Günter Guni 
(C-278/08) [2010] ETMR 592 ¶ 35–36; Portakabin v. Primakabin (Case C-558/08) [2010] ETMR 930; 
Interflora v. Marks & Spencer (C-323/09) [2012] ETMR 1. 
83 See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 270. 
84 Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global 
Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007). 
85 On these characteristics, see supra notes 47–51.  In the case of experience products including services, 
it is possible to shift at least some of the risks and other costs of information asymmetry onto the provider 
through the terms of the transaction. 




“adverse selection”: they would have no reason to pay any more for products purporting 
to have unverifiable quality they desire than they would be willing to pay for products 
whose quality was no greater than the level they could verify at the time of purchase.86 
¶35  An undertaking producing or supplying products with significant unverifiable 
quality would therefore have to accept a sub-optimal price for its products or rely on 
mechanisms such as an offer to refund the purchase price in the event of disappointment 
to offset the risk of adverse selection that consumers of its products would face.  
However, the costs that this would represent can be viewed as investment in building up a 
good track record for the marked products (which may include responding constructively 
to consumer disappointment) and, in turn, a good reputation that may encapsulate 
information about both unverifiable quality and the undertaking’s behavior.87  A good 
reputation reflecting a good track record on these matters should enable an undertaking to 
charge a higher price for its products than would be possible otherwise, and this premium 
can be viewed as a return on the investment.  Moreover, a good reputation provides 
quality assurance because the owner has an incentive to maintain or improve it in order to 
maintain or increase the premium price it can charge.88 
¶36  In this way, therefore, trade marks create a dynamic incentive for undertakings to 
maintain or improve the quality of their products and more generally to meet the 
expectations of consumers.  The strength of the incentive at a particular point in time 
depends on how far the potential benefits of doing this exceed the net potential benefits 
of pursuing a course of action that may risk damaging the trade mark’s reputation 
concerning product quality and therefore its value as a source of quality assurance.  Such 
potential damage could take the form of  lower product quality, a lower level of  likely 
consistency in the quality of the marked products or an increase in the risk of consumer 
dissatisfaction, for example by altering the arrangements for producing or procuring the 
marked products in order to reduce costs.  The potential value of a good reputation is 
likely to increase in line with the lead time that must elapse before any shortfall in quality 
is likely to become apparent,89 but this factor also increases the investment that is likely 
to be required to generate a good reputation.  Moreover, the reputation has to offset the 
additional risk that the owner could continue to “milk” it for some time and charge a 
premium price despite a decline in actual product quality.  To do this, the trade mark’s 
value as a marketing resource and therefore the owner’s interest in maintaining or 
improving it should be high enough to exceed the potential benefit of “milking” it.90  
Building up this value may not only require a much higher level of investment, but may 
require investment in something more than building up a good track record. 
 
86 See supra note 44. 
87 On how some leading brands have achieved, maintained, or strengthened their attractive power 
through responding constructively to setbacks and learning from mistakes, see KOEHN, supra note 33 at 
321–26. 
88 The capacity of a legal person to acquire a reputation has been recognized as a safeguard against the 
risks and costs associated with information deficiency and other problems that can make complete 
contracting prohibitively expensive if not impossible.  Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of 
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Carl Shapiro, 
Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1982); Carl Shapiro, 
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q. J. ECON. 659 (1983). 
89 Shapiro, supra note 89. 
90 Id. 
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¶37  Investment in one form or another is necessary to generate a trade mark’s capacity 
to provide quality assurance.91  However, building up a good track record for marked 
products is not the only kind of investment that can have this effect.  The investment 
should signal an increase in the owner’s stake in the trade mark’s value as a marketing 
resource and therefore in its power to attract consumers to marked products on the basis 
that its continuing appeal is necessary to secure the owner’s return on the investment.  Its 
effectiveness also depends on consumers being aware of the extent of the owner’s stake 
in this appeal.  Such investment can therefore include expenditure on advertising and 
other promotional activity such as sponsorship and securing endorsements for the marked 
products.92  In addition to boosting the trade mark’s capacity to provide quality assurance, 
the owner may be able to use investment of this kind to give the trade mark the capacity 
to confer intangible quality on the marked products.93  The owner may, for example, 
invest in creating an image or aura for the trade mark or seek to associate it with social 
status or a particular attitude or set of values.94 
¶38  The idea that a trade mark can provide quality assurance by being offered as a stake 
to consumers against the risks and other costs of information asymmetry provides an 
additional reason for engaging in the practices known as “brand extension” and “brand 
stretching,” which involve using a trade mark (and in effect the brand that the trade mark 
signifies) to sell products of a similar kind or kinds as those for which it has gained a 
reputation or even products which are quite dissimilar.95  An undertaking can engage in 
these practices by using or sanctioning the use of the same trade mark or a trade mark 
that relevant consumers are likely to recognize as signifying an organizational link of 
some kind.96  Engaging in these practices increases the undertaking’s return from the 
trade mark’s power to attract consumers, but also increases its vulnerability to bad 
publicity.  The scope for profiting from these practices does not therefore depend on 
products having characteristics in common or requiring the same kind of expertise to 
produce or supply, though these factors would reduce the engagement costs of an 
undertaking including the increased vulnerability of the trade mark’s reputation and 
therefore of its marketing power. 
¶39  The quality that a trade mark signifies may therefore relate to the undertaking 
behind it as well to the marked products.  It can provide quality assurance that reflects a 
good track record in responding to consumer dissatisfaction and adverse publicity as well 
as the track record of the marked products.  For some consumers at least, this may be 
sufficient to offset a significant risk of disappointment in terms of functional and material 
quality and especially in the case of a new or “improved” product.  Where setbacks and 
other problems do occur, the extent to which a constructive response to them mitigates 
the negative impact on the trade mark’s attractive power or even strengthens it is likely to 
depend on how far the problems are due to risks inherent in product development or other 
 
91 The CJEU’s reference to the functions of a trade mark as including “those of communication, 
investment or advertising” alludes to this importance.  See, e.g., L’Oréal v. Bellure [2009] ETMR 987 ¶ 58. 
92 See supra note 88; Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974). 
93 Klein & Leffler, supra note 89. 
94 See supra notes 33–35. 
95 These terms tend to be used loosely and interchangeably in the literature on marketing.  See, e.g., Jay 
Pil Choi, Brand Extension as Informational Leverage, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 655 (1998); Lynne M. Pepall 
& Daniel J. Richards, The Simple Economics of Brand Stretching, 75 J. BUS. 535 (2002). 
96 See supra note 79. 




forms of innovation as opposed to relaxing previous standards of quality control.97  
Accordingly, the ability to project “organizational quality” can be a valuable resource for 
a firm that wishes to engage in innovation.  From this perspective, the flexibility of a 
trade mark’s guarantee of product quality gives the owner some space to improve the 
marked products or to make other changes which consumers may well come to value, but 
which involve a significant risk of not doing so. 
¶40  The CJEU’s view that trade marks are an essential element in the achievement of a 
system of undistorted competition is based on their capacity to provide quality assurance 
in the ways that have been described.  This capacity also contributes to improving the 
long-term competitiveness of undertakings and to promoting innovation, which are major 
economic goals of the European Union.98  In this respect, it is pertinent that the Directive 
provides additional protection to trade marks that have gained a “reputation” in the minds 
of consumers that focuses specifically on protecting the value which such trade marks 
may have acquired as marketing resources.99  The CJEU has ruled that this provision 
should only protect trade marks that have gained a presence in the minds of consumers 
and only protect such marks from signs that engage with that presence.100  The owner of a 
trade mark must prove that, as a result of this engagement, the sign in question has caused 
damage to the trade mark’s ability to identify products as coming from the owner or to its 
power to attract consumers or has taken unfair advantage of these attributes and the third 
party must be unable to show “due cause.”101 
¶41  This provision ensures that the protection of trade marks which provide quality 
assurance can be calibrated with express reference to this capacity, to the various ways in 
 
97 It has been argued that an undertaking’s incentive to maintain a good reputation for product quality 
may discourage it from engaging in radical (as opposed to incremental) forms of innovation.  Cole & 
Matsumiya, supra note 14. 
98 The European Union has declared a commitment to “competitiveness” in its strategies for economic 
growth, these being the “Lisbon Strategy,” which was launched in 2000 and re-launched in 2005, and the 
“Europe 2020 Strategy,” which revized the goals of the Lisbon Strategy in the light of the subsequent 
economic crisis.  These strategies emphasized the importance of innovation in improving the 
competitiveness of firms.  See A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020. 
99 Article 5.2 of the Directive provides that the owner of such a trade mark should be entitled to prohibit 
an unauthorized third party from using an identical or similar sign in the course of trade “where use of that 
sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of 
the trade mark.”  Member States are not obliged to implement this additional protection, but the CJEU has 
ruled that any Member State which has done so must confer the full scope of the additional protection in 
accordance with the CJEU’s rulings on its meaning.  Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld (C-408/01) [2004] 
ETMR 129. The CJEU has ruled that, to have the necessary “reputation,” a trade mark must be known by at 
least a significant part of the relevant public (which, depending on the nature of the goods or services for which 
the trade mark is registered, may be the general public or a specialized section of the public) and throughout at 
least a substantial part of the relevant territory.  General Motors v. Yplon (C-375/97) [1999] ETMR 950.  
Despite its wording, the CJEU has ruled that this provision covers a third party’s use of a sign in relation to 
products of any kind including those which are identical or similar to those for which the trade mark has been 
registered as well as those which are “not similar.”  Davidoff & Cie v. Gofkid (C-292/00) [2003] ETMR 534; 
Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld (C-408/01) [2004] ETMR 129. 
100 In particular, the owner must also show that the third party’s use of its sign (whether it is identical 
with or similar to the trade mark) leads relevant consumers to make a mental “link” with the trade mark.  
Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld (C-408/01) [2004] ETMR 129 ¶ 29; Intel Corporation v. CPM (C-252/07) 
[2009] ETMR 233 ¶¶ 40–64. 
101 On detriment to “distinctive character,” see Intel Corporation v. CPM (C-252/07) [2009] ETMR 233 
¶¶ 29, 56, 76; on detriment to “repute,” see  L’Oréal SAv. Bellure NV (Case C-487/07) [2009] ETMR 987 
¶ 40; on taking “unfair advantage” of these attributes, see  id. ¶ 49. 
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which third parties might seek to exploit this capacity, and to the wider economic 
implications of enabling third parties to do this.  This can be seen in particular in the 
CJEU’s portrayal of taking an “unfair advantage” as seeking, without have any due cause 
for doing so, to ride “on the coat-tails” of a trade mark with a reputation in order “to 
benefit from its power of attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without 
paying any financial compensation and without being required to make efforts of his own 
in that regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to 
create and maintain the image of that mark.”102 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶42  As product identifiers that are under the exclusive control of one undertaking, trade 
marks enable undertakings to market their products and to secure specific demand for 
them.  This article has noted two ways in which undertakings can use trade marks to do 
this, namely to provide assurance about the quality of their products and to confer 
intangible quality upon them.  It has also been seen that in some cases the latter activity 
can contribute to the former so that the two cannot be entirely separated from each other. 
¶43  Using a trade mark to provide quality assurance about marked products enables an 
undertaking to gain a competitive advantage which may be based both on the quality of 
its products (including any intangible quality) and on the strength of the assurance that it 
does provide about their quality.  Accordingly, trade marks are an essential feature of a 
system of competition that encompasses competition based on product quality.  They 
increase the incentives that undertakings have to monitor and improve their systems of 
quality control and to maintain or improve the quality of their products.  Trade marks also 
provide undertakings with a useful safeguard against some of the risks involved in 
product improvement and other forms of innovation which may affect product quality 
and therefore strengthen the incentives to compete through innovation. 
¶44  The reasons why undertakings may need to provide quality assurance in order to be 
able to compete effectively are because products of the same kind can differ from each 
other in various ways, because consumers may attach value to these differences and be 
willing to trade them off against price in their decision-making, and because consumers 
may be unable to discern and evaluate some of these differences at the time of purchase 
or at least would face substantial costs in order to do so.  This article has considered the 
various characteristics that can contribute to the overall quality of competing products 
and which therefore offer undertakings various ways to achieve a competitive advantage. 
¶45  A related problem is that it may be difficult to specify the entire combination of 
characteristics that contribute to a product’s overall quality (including the absence of 
various deficiencies), especially when some of these result from the application of tacit 
knowledge and organizational capabilities that may be unique to a particular undertaking.    
Trade marks can help both undertakings and consumers to overcome this problem of 
communication by linking products on the basis that they are likely to be consistent with 
each other to the extent that can be achieved by one undertaking having unitary control 
over their quality.  However, the quality assurance that a trade mark can provide also has 
 
102 See supra note 13, at ¶ 49. 
 




flexibility which leaves room for product development.  In this respect, a trade mark’s 
capacity to signify organizational quality is a valuable component of its overall guarantee  
of quality.
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